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Introduction
Public interestin governmentpolicyand programs incredit, particu-
larly agriculturalcredit, hasremainedhighsincecreditpolicyis popularly
(andpolitically)perceivedto be part ofthe solutionstodevelopmentand
poverty-alleviation problems. Muchofthe discussionsaboutagricultural
credit and rural finance, however, has taken place in contextswhere
informationaboutactualcreditconditions islacking,thus;theseareoften
dominatedmoreby rhetoricthan fact.
Yet the Philippineexperienceand those of other countriesreveal
thatcreditpoliciesand programs,including their mannerof implementa-
tionoverthe pasttwo decades,are of doubtfulvalue. Twentyyears of
subsidized,targetted credit,previouslybelievedto solve development
problems,have wasted the scarceresourcesof the public,engendered
distortionsin financialmarkets,and introducedconfusionin the public
mindaboutloans,subsidies,andevencharity(Adams,Graham,andVon
Pischke1984; Tolentino1986).
To put the issues in their proper contextand to make for more
informeddiscussions, this articleprovidessomefacts and observations
aboutagriculturalcredit. Theyarederived from the ongoingprogramto
rehabilitatethe ruralbanks (Dominguez1988),the effort to re-orientthe
Executive Director, ACPCandActingAssistant Secretary for Policyand
Planning, Department of Agriculture, Philippines.
Thispaperisaneditedandexpanded version of"Thirty-three FactsAbout
Philippine, Agricultural Credit,"Staff Paper 87-02, Agricultural CreditPolicy
Council, 1987.Thecomments andsuggestions ofDr.DaleAdams ofOhioState
University andMr.Pablito Villegas oftheLandBankof thePhilippines werevery
helpful. Theassistance ofMessrs. LeoCa_edaandPaulBernardLoboofthe
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concept of "Supervised Credit," and the creation of the Comprehensive
Agricultural Loan Fund or CALF (Tolentino 1986). This paper also
includes the 20-year experience in rural banking and agricultural credit of
the Philippines and other selected countries (Von Pischke, Meyer, and
Graham 1986). Reference is further made to a larger set of studies on
rural finance undertaken, some jointly and some indepedently, by re-
searchers and analysts at the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC),
the Philippine Institute for. Development Studies (PIDS), Ohio State
University (OSU), and the University of the Philippines (UP).
The Status of Rural Banks
1. As of December 1987, there were 850 operating rural banks.
This contrasts sharply with the peak year of 1981when there were 1,167
existing rural banks. As the Philippine economy deteriorated from.1980
onwards, the government found that it could no longer afford to keep the
subsidies and lending funds flowing to, and through, the rural banks.
Simultaneously, rural bankers began to find it more difficult to secure
funds and subsidies from. the government. As a consequence, they
could not roll over or re-finance existing loans. Finding that rural banking
was no longer an .easily profitable .business,many rural bankers chose
to close shop. Other rural banks that were seriously in financial trouble
were also closed by the government as a matter of law and regular
supervision (Dominguez 1988).....
2. Of the 856 rural banks that were still operating by the end of
1986, 82 percent were behind in their repayments on their government
loans at very heavily subsidized iates of one and three percent (Task
Force 1986). Of these arrearages, 93 percent were past due for at least
a year (Ad Hoc Committee 1986); most of these obligations were also
uncollateralized and, as such, probably uncollectible. Many rural banks
then bore heavy burdens of bills payable to the Central Bank and
portfolios dominated by loans that were long past due.
3. Most of the rural banks are in trouble because of two major
reasons. First, since their portfoliosare heavily exposed to agriculture,
they bear the burdenof the generallygreater riskinvolvedin agricultural
projects(Graham 1985). As a whole, 57 percentof the existingloans
made by rural banks are made to agriculturalprojects,while only 7
percentof thosemadeby non-ruralbanksaregivento agriculture(ACPC
1988). Second, rural banks have become very dependent on the
governmentfor their supply of Ioanable funds and for management
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programs, they cannot diversify their portfoliosand spread their risks
(Dominguez1988). Also, they have failed to mobilizesavingsas the
source of lending funds, either because they neglected to generate
depositsor because they are locatedin areas where savingsare not
forthcomingin the first place (Blanco and Meyer 1988). In essence,
rural banks do not operate like banks.
4. Given the dependenceof.ruralbanks on government-supplied
subsidiesand funds, it is not surprisingthat rural bankers gave the
loudestprotestsagainstthe new policieswhich effectivelyreduce their
access to the very low-costgovernment depositsand re-discounting
funds. Yet it shouldbe kept in mind thatthe intentof the new set of
policieswas notto helprural bankersalone;rather,the newpoliciesare
aimedatproviding creditfortheentireruraleconomyoverthemedium and
long-run (Tolentino1988)
5. The ongoingrehabilitationprocessfor rural banks isselective
in the sense that only those rural bankerswillingand able to make a
commitmentto continued banking,and those ruralbanks still able to
recoverwithoutlong-term,continuedsubsidies from publicresourceswill
be ableto participate(Dominguez1988).
6. Participationin the rehabilitationprogram is further selective
sinceitis conditionedbythe stockholders' infusionof freshcapitalinto
their ruralbanks. The amountof freshcapitalrequired forentry intothe
programisdependent, notonlyon the financialhealthof the bank,but
alsoonthe capacityofthe ruralbankerto managean extended,15-year
programto repay its obligationsand write down the bad loans in its
portfolio. The completionof the rehabilitationprocessshould see the
emergence of a smaller,but strongerruralbankingsystem.
The Supply of Agricultural Credit
7. Of the totalsupplyof formalcreditto agriculturalproductionin
1986, only about 12 percent was suppliedthroughthe rural banks,
Commercialbanks suppliedthe bulkor 82 percentof the loans(ACPC
1988b).
8. The total estimated demands for agricultural production cre-
dit in the Philippines in 1987 reached over 1D60billion (Tolentino 1986).
9. The government had direct control of only about t_1 billion in
agricultural funds. Aboutl_700 million of these fundswere consolidated248 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
into the CALF. Thus, the government could only serve, on a direct
lending basis, potentially not more than 16 percent of the total credit
demand for 1987.
10. Even at the peak of the government's supervised credit pro-
grams in 1979, thegovernment was able to supply only 24 per-centof
all bank agricultural production credit. Inthe past 20 years, the average
proportion of total formal credit flows provided by government sources
came to only about 12 percent. In 1986, the government-supplied
proportion had dropped to only two percent. The private banking sector
has always provided the bulk of formal production credit (ACPC 1988b).
11. The government has always subsidized the cost of credit
heavily. In the period 1970-80, the government lent money to the
Philippine National Bank and rural banks at. one to three percent;
unfortunately, it had to borrow these funds from abroad at open-market,
commercial rates of thirteen and one-halt percent (Ad Hoc Committee
1986).
12. While both the government and the rural banks are short of
Ioanable funds, the rest of the banking system is very liquid. The
estimated excess reserves of the system in mid-1987 was over t_35
billion. It seems that the principal thrust of policy then must be to
encourage banks to lend their funds to agriculture. The government's
role Is to provide the Incentives, risk-reducing mechanisms, and
guarantees so that the banks with the funds will be willing to
perform the required lending (Dominguez1988).
13. The CALF is designedto serveas a guaranteefund, not as a
lendingfund. Throughthismechanism,the governmenthopesto reduce
the risk of bank lending to agriculture as well as maximize limited
governmentfunds. The operationsof the Quedan Guarantee Fund
Board (QGFB) illustratessuch leveragingof limitedfunds. While its
guaranteebase in 1986 and 1987was onlyt=95 million,QGFB was able
to guarantee a totalofl_t .1 billionworthof loansin 1986 andt_=1.5 billion
in 1987, achievinga multipliereffect eleven times its capital base for
the formeryear and 15 timesforthe latter(Tolentino1988b).
Informal Lenders
14. Two-thirdsof all Filipinofarmers who borrow, do so from
informallenders(TechnicalBoard for AgriculturalCredit (TBAC) 1986,
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to borrowers,givingthe loansat the farmer'shouse and collectingthe
repayment at the farmgate. They even accept payments in kind.
Informal lenders also hardlydemand processingand paperwork;they
also lend not only for productionbut also for consumptionpurposes
(Lamberte 1985).
15. In nominal terms, the borrowingrates charged by informal
lenders appear to be much higher than those charged by banks.
However, these nominal rates do not considerthe borrowingcosts
involvedin processingtime, loss in productiondue to delays in the
release of loans, transportationbetweenthe borrowers' home and the
bank,paperwork, literacyrequirements,and the needto repay loansin
cash(Abiad, Graham,and Cuevas 1988). All ofthesefactors translate
into added costs (transactionscosts) of borrowing. Thus when the
effective borrowing rate is considered,the rates charged by banks
become comparableto, it not higherthan, those charged by informal
lenders. This helpsexplainwhy inspireof the lowernominalborrowing
rate charged by banks, most farmers stillchoose to borrowfrom the
informalsector(De Jesusand Cuevas 1988, Lamberte1985).
16. Governmentmustprovidean atmospherewhereinbankscan
reducethe effectiveborrowingrateat whichtheylend. Policiesto reduce
intermediation and transactioncostsarethereforecritical.These include
the streamlining of the regulatoryrequirementsimposedby government,
increasinginvestmentsin ruralinfrastructure to lowerthe cost of trans-
portationand communications in the ruralareas, and providingguaran-
tee schemesthatdecreasethe bank'scostof absorbingdefaults (Abiad,
Graham, and Cuevas 1988, De Jesusand Cuevas 1988, Untalan and
Cuevas 1988).
17. The lender's cost of absorbingsuch defaults is criticalbe-
causethe lender, informal or formal,alsoshares the risksin lending. In
many cases,the basiccollateralthat the lenderexactsis the condition
that when a borrowerdefaults°he cannot borrow again (Floro 1986).
The costof such risk-takingtranslatesinto higherlendingrates by the
banks and the informallenders(Untalan and Cuevas 1988).
The Government's Performance as a Banker
18. Asidefrom lending fundsvia the Central Bank, government
departments,particularlythe Departmentof Agriculture,assumedthe
roleof a bankduringthe pasttwodecades. But government'sperform-
ance as a bankerhasbeendismal. The average repaymentrateon the250 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
government-runprograms is about 49 percent. This effectively makes
the government give away halt ofthe money. Furthermore,the govern-
ment's administrative cost of almost eight centavos per peso lentout was
about three times the administrative cost of the private sector (Tolentino
1986, Soberano 1986).
19. Until the creation of CALF, the government managed a total of
39 separate, commodity-targetted, subsidized credit programs for agri-
culture. (Notethat only 17of the 39 programswere consolidated intothe
CALF). These programs were run by management committees whose
members were part-time detailees from the various departments. Ironi-
cally, each of the committees' and administrative budgets, averaging half
a million pesosper year, principally consisted of the committee members'
honoraria (Tolentino 1986).
20. The fact that the government was a direct lender put a great
deal of discretion in the hands of the bureaucracy which had little or no
capacity to perform banking functions. Such discretion gave rise to
patronage powers and relationships in allocating credit; it then opened
the possibility of corruption. It also created a perception in the public
mind (buttressed by observations of actual cases) that borrowers could
go direct to the offices of the Department of Agriculture and leave with
checks in their hands (Tolentino 1986).
Subsidized Credit as "Assistance" to Farmers
2i. Even if governmentmade "cheap" credit available, it did not
reallyhelpthe smallproportionoffarmerswho actuallywere ableto get
them. The cost of creditin proportionto the farmer's total production
cost isonly about sixpercent. The criticalcostsare thoseforfertilizer,
35 percent; pesticides, 15 percent; seeds, 9 percent; and labor, 35
percent(Caneda 1986). Therefore,governmentassistancefocusedon
loweringthe costofthese criticalinputswillgo a lotfartherthansupport
in termsof cheap credit. Even if credit were available to farmers at
no cost, the effect would at most be only a six percent reduction in
production cost.
22. The subsidyelement in concessionalcreditis tied to the size
of the loan. Small loans provide small subsidies while large loans
generate large subsidies. As such,the largerfarmersalwaysendedup
gettingthe large loans, and thereforethe greater subsidies. Credit-
based subsidiesthen become regressive.TOLENTINO: PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURALCREDIT 251
Subsidized Credit and the Banking System's Efficiency
23. The governmentcannotforcebanksto chargethe lowestbor-
rowingratesandacceptthe mostdefaultsonthe smallest,riskiestloans.
Unless the govemmentis willingand able to absorbthe cost of such
policies,to requirethat banks act accordingly would be tantamountto
forcingbanks to commitfinancial suicide.
24. In the same vein that governmentcannotforce banks to act
againstbasicbankingprinciples, the government cannotforceborrowers
to applythe loansthey receiveto pre-determineduses. Indeed, loans
maybe releasedin kind. Butthe farmermayhave borrowedfor ricenot
because he perceivesthat rice productionis profitable,but because
loansfor riceproduction were available. Credit is fungible: that is,the
farmercan receivethe loansinkind,sellthe commodities, thenapplythe
proceedstowardsthe investmenthe perceives to be profitable.Norcan
the supervisionof the farmer by the extension agent prevent "loan
diversion,"since it is impossibleforthe extensionagent to be on hand
24 hours a day.
25. The bureaucraticstructuresand proceduresbuilt aroundthe
supervisedcreditschemestransferredthe responsibility forthe decision-
makingon loansfromthe bankstothe national,departmentlevelwhere
the "guidelines"for loan programswere formulated. Unfortunately,the
guidelinesdid not oftencorrespondwith localrealities;yetthey hadtobe
followedor no loanfundswouldbe released. The basicfunctionof loan
appraisalwas then subverted and shiftedaway from the professional
lendersto the Manila-basedbureaucrats(Tolentino1986).
26. A specificcase of a guideline not correspondingto actual
realityisthe limitation on loansizesaccordingto nationalstandards. Yet
the limits barely covered commodityinput costs. Labor costs were
supposedtobe equity-sourced.Yet the newtechnologyforhigh-yielding
varieties make the use of hired labor almost compulsory. Thus the
farmer has to borrow additionalamounts from the informal market to
coverthe costof labor. Forobviousreasons,he also pays the informal
lender first.
27. Subsidizedinterestrates may also act as a disincentiveto
deposits. Since banks are intermediaries, they mustmobilizedeposits
astheirprimarysourceoffundsfor relending.Withthe operationof legal
ceilingson interestrates, borrowingrateson loanswere helddown,and
the interestratespaidondepositsalsohadto be depressedsincebanksZ52 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
have to make a margin, a spread betweentheir borrowingand lending
rates. To the extentthatthe savingpublicis sensitiveto incentivesand
changesindepositinterestrates,thensavingsare keptawayfrombanks
as depositratesfall (De Jesusand Cuevas 1988, Rodriguezand Meyer
1988). The capon interestrates, intandemwiththe available low-cost
fundsfromgovernment, thushelpexplainthedependenceof ruralbanks
on government-supplied depositsand Ioanablefunds (Tolentino1986).
28. AlthoughP.D. 717 (theAgri-AgraLoanQuota Law) mandates
thatbanksallocatea minimumof 25 percentof theirloansto agricultural
projectsand agrarianreformbeneficiaries,in practice,banks have lent
only an average of less than ten percentof their loansto agricultural
projects. Bankshesitateto face the greater risksand transactioncosts
inherentin agricultural projects;and so theytake the safe way out: they
investingovernmentsecurities. But sincesuchsecuritiesearn at much
lowerrates, PD 717 in effect raisesthe intermediationcostof banks, a
costwhichin effectfurtherreducescredit flowsand increasesborrowing
rates for the financialsystem and the publicas a whole.
Subsidized Credit, Agricultural Profitability
and Agricultural Production
29. Cheap credit cannot make an unprofitable project profit-
able. The criticalelementsthatwillensurethe positiveprofitabilityof ag-




30. The burdenof supportingagricultural profitability fallsnotonly
on the effectivenessof the Departmentof Agricul-turebut alsoon the
other govemment depadmentsand agenciesto:
a) providethe criticalsupport infrastructure for efficiency,pro-
ductivity,tradeandcommerce - irrigation, roads,ports,bridges,
electrification,storage,and transport;
b) increasethe productivityof agriculturallabor;
c) ensurethe adequatesupplyand reducethe pricesoffertilizer,
pesticides,and seeds;
d) improve the effectiveness of thegovemment,principally through
the NationalFood Authority,in stabilizingthe pricesof palay
for farmersand rice for consumers;and
e) reformthe tradepolicieswhichdecreasedthe incomerealizedTOLENTINO: PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURALCREDIT 263
both by the country and by the farmers from our agricultural .
exports.
31. itisoftenclaimedthatthe scarcityof agricultural credithasled
to productionshortfalls, particularlyin rice. Dataon availablebankcredit
and agriculturalproductivityshow that the relationshipbetween rice
production and bankcredit(if a causal, howevertenuous,relationship is
to be presumed)is negative. Whilethe averageflowsof riceproduction
credit from banks have been decreasing at a rate of over 14 percent
per year, palay production has consistently Increased at abouttwo
percent. Even in 1984, when the flow of credit from banks for rice
production fell by 65 percent,pa/ay production stillgrewby 1.3 percent.
32. Furthermore,shouldanyrelationship betweencreditflowsand
farm incomelevelsbe presumed,the data onavailablebank credit and
the incomes of agriculturalfamiliesis alsoworth noting. Indeed,the
flow of bankcredit has been decreasingat a rate of about 1.4 percent
per year. In contrast,per capita incomein agriculturestillgrew by 0.3
percent per year.
33. Finally, when the profitability of agricultural projects Is
assured, then credit would flow towards it without the need for a
specialized credit program. Farmerswho are ableto repaytheir living
costswillalsopayoff theirloans. Bankersandfarmersare moreastute
and trustworthythan what is often assumed by traditionalcredit pro-
grams. They will invest in projectsthat they think will bring them
adequate returnson theirinvestments.They do pay,butonlyafterthey
have assuredthat the basic needs of theirfamilieshave been met.
Conclusion
It is clear that the adequate availabilityof finance is a must for
growth. Yet the meansto enhancefinancialflowsisunclear. The good
intentionsbehindmanygovernmentefforts to channel creditto agricul-
ture were eclipsed,by the actual, adverse effects of the programsand
policies. The lessons of experience, painful and expensive as these are,
now tell us that undue intervention by government in the financial market
can lead to undesirable results. The critical elements which enable and
attract finance to agriculture are often not found in the financial system,
but in the infrastructure, agriculture, trade, and monetary systems.
These systems interact, and in the context of appropriate policies, serve
to create a dynamic, resurgent rural economy - the medium within which
the financial system and the rural dweller can thrive.254 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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